

Discussion of  
"Inflation and Treasury Convenience"  
by Anna Cieslak, Wenhao Li, and Carolin Pflueger


Vadim Elenev  
Johns Hopkins Carey  
SFS Cavalcade | May 2024

# Why we should all care about this paper


- Given market prices of assets with similar cash flows, it should be 80 bps more expensive for the Treasury to borrow than it is.
- [Marketable] debt outstanding: [\\$24.6 trillion](#)
- $0.8\% \times \$24.6T$  approx. \$200B / year savings
- Entire Federal transportation budget is only [\\$115B](#)

# Why we should all care about this paper

- But this “convenience yield” varies over time
  - Risky asset for the Treasury
- Understanding the asset pricing properties of Treasury convenience yields key for assessment of fiscal capacity
- This paper: relationship between convenience yields and inflation
  - Particularly relevant given last few years





# Empirics: Three Regimes



- Inter-war & 21<sup>st</sup> century: low inflation and negative correlation
- Second half of 21<sup>st</sup> century: high inflation and positive correlation
- Robust to controls, shifts in sample bounds, lead-lags

# Empirics: Frequencies



- Particularly pronounced effects at low frequencies: apply lowpass filter to monthly data
  - Left panel: Example with normalized filter frequency of 0.001
  - Right panel: correlations of filtered series for a range of frequencies. Low frequency correlations are higher.


# Theory: Two Channels


- Money: Inflation increases convenience yields on bonds because it raises the opportunity cost of holding the other convenient asset – money
  - For another monetary take on inflation and portfolio choice, see Aoki, Michaelides, Nikolov, Zhang (2024)
  - Consistent with the second panel
- Safety: a liquidity shock that raises the convenience yield of Treasuries effectively raises the private market real rate, acts like a negative demand shock, lowers inflation
  - Consistent with the first and the third

# Identifying Drivers of Co-Movement

- An SVAR perspective
- Reduced-form VAR(1) with convenience yield and inflation
- $$\begin{bmatrix} {}^C y_t \\ \pi_t \end{bmatrix} = \Phi \begin{bmatrix} {}^C y_{t-1} \\ \pi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + u_t, \quad E_{t-1}[u_t u_t'] = \Omega \quad (2 \times 2)$$
- Structural VAR:  $u_t = H \Sigma \epsilon_t$ 
  - $\epsilon_t$  is an  $N \times 1$  vector of shocks with identity covariance matrix
  - $\Sigma$  is a  $N \times N$  diagonal matrix of shock standard deviations
  - $H$  is  $2 \times N$  mapping of “structural” shocks to reduced-form innovations
- Identification challenge: we can estimate  $\Omega$  from the data, but without additional restrictions that's not enough to identify economic channels  $H$  (even if  $N=2$ )

# Two Approaches for Imposing Restrictions

- Micro-founded model provides cross-equation restrictions:  $\Phi$ ,  $H$ , and  $\Sigma$  are all functions of model parameters. Use empirical estimates of  $\Phi$  and  $\Omega$  to estimate parameters, then calculate  $H$ 
  - Shocks  $\epsilon_t$  show up in model equations, get economic interpretation
  - Write model such that  $\epsilon_{1,t}$  directly affects  $cy_t$ ,  $\epsilon_{2,t}$  directly affects  $\pi_t$
  - Direct channel :=  $H_{12}$  or  $H_{21}$  a function of statistical parameters
  - Other channels:  $H_{12}$  or  $H_{21}$  a function of preference, technology, etc. parameters,  $H_{1j}$  or  $H_{2j}$  non-zero for  $j > 2$
- Alternative approaches: long/short-run restrictions, narrative/**event-based partial ID**, etc.
  - E.g., Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2021) 
  - Informally, already in the current paper when rejecting a FTPL explanation for the GFC episode
  - Why not formalize?





# A 2+N Equation New Keynesian Model

- Taylor Rule (subject to MP shocks)
- New Keynesian Philips Curve (subject to supply shocks)
- N Euler Equations for N assets
  - The “real rate” is given by consumption dynamics (subject to demand shocks)
  - Nominal rate on each asset depends on
    - Real rate
    - Expected inflation
    - Marginal non-pecuniary benefit of the asset (“convenience yields”) – subject to “liquidity” shocks”)
  - Traditionally, two assets
    - Bond in 0 net supply with 0 convenience yield (“IS equation” + “Fisher Equation”)
    - Money (-in-the-utility) whose supply is M is chosen by the central bank such that convenience yield = bond nominal rate, i.e., nominal return on money is 0
  - To have other assets in positive supply (so they can provide convenience), need either other agents (heterogeneous households, intermediaries, government) or some exogenous market-clearing

# This 2+3 Equation New Keynesian Model

$$U(C_t, Q_t, N_t; \Theta_t) = \frac{\Theta_t C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \alpha \log Q_t - \chi \frac{N_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta}$$
$$Q_t = (1 - \lambda_t) D_t + \lambda B_t$$

- The “real rate” is given by consumption dynamics (subject to  $\Theta$  MU demand shocks)
- Loans  $i^l$  : no convenience yield, zero net supply and market-clearing rate
- **Treasuries**  $i^b$  : some convenience yield and rate set by a Taylor rule
- Deposits  $i^d$  : most convenience yield and exogenous prices:  $1 + i^d = \delta(1 + i^l)$ 
  - Pins down  $Q$ , i.e., plays the role of the money supply equation in a standard NK model with money, where  $\delta = \lambda = 0$  and so money supply  $Q = \alpha \Theta C^{-\gamma}$  in steady state
- **Liquidity shock** to  $\lambda$  changes **relative** convenience of treasuries vs. deposits
- What kind of shocks cause a flight to safety into treasuries **from** deposits and money?

# Inflation → Convenience Yields

$$cy_t^b := i_t^l - i_t^b = \frac{\lambda_t(1 - \delta)}{1 - \lambda_t - \lambda_t(1 - \delta)} (1 + i_t^b)$$

- If  $\delta$  is less than 1 (imperfect pass-through of loan rates to deposits) and  $\lambda_t$  is less than 1/2 (deposits are more convenient than Treasuries), convenience yields increase with the policy rate  $i_t^b$ 
  - Which increases with inflation
- Cost-push shocks of the 1970s explain positive co-movement
  1. But does  $\delta$  stay constant?
    - Dreschler, Savov, and Schnabl (2023) argue that repeal of Reg Q raised  $\delta$  causing lower inflation
    - Simultaneous increase in  $i_t^b$  and  $\delta$  has ambiguous effects on  $cy_t^b$  in expression above
  2. Curious implication of the perfect substitutability assumption
    - If deposits are money ( $\delta = 0$ ) and if Treasuries are as convenient as money ( $\lambda_t = 1/2$ ), then according to this model the Fed can't conduct monetary policy

# Convenience Yields $\rightarrow$ Inflation

- In a standard model, IS + Fisher equation

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \gamma^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + v_{x,t}$$

- Shows how policy rate  $i_t$  -- the only rate in the model -- lowers the output gap  $x_t$  like a negative demand shock  $v_{x,t}$

# Convenience Yields $\rightarrow$ Inflation

- In a standard model, IS + Fisher equation

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \gamma^{-1} (i_t^l - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + v_{x,t}$$

- Shows how policy rate  $i_t$  -- the only rate in the model -- lowers the output gap  $x_t$  like a negative demand shock  $v_{x,t}$
- But here, the rate that matters for intertemporal substitution is  $i_t^l$

# Convenience Yields $\rightarrow$ Inflation

- In a standard model, IS + Fisher equation

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \gamma^{-1} (i_t^b + cy_t^b - E_t \pi_{t+1}) + v_{x,t}$$

- Shows how policy rate  $i_t$  -- the only rate in the model -- lowers the output gap  $x_t$  like a negative demand shock  $v_{x,t}$
- But here, the rate that matters for intertemporal substitution is  $i_t^b + cy_t^b$ 
  - Log-linearized  $cy_t^b = a\lambda_t + b i_t^b$  split into direct and inflation-driven effects

# Convenience Yields → Inflation

- Plugging NKPC into the Taylor Rule, [inflation-only] Taylor rule and cy into IS + Fisher, we get

$$x_t = \frac{\gamma}{\gamma+(1+b)\phi} E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{[(1+b)\phi-1]}{\gamma+(1+b)\phi} E_t \pi_{t+1} + \frac{\gamma}{\gamma+(1+b)\phi} v_{x,t} - \frac{a}{\gamma+(1+b)\phi} \lambda_t$$

- **+ Convenience yield shock** looks like a **- demand shock**:
  - Central bank sets convenient rate. Spike in cy raises the private rate, causing a contraction that's only partly offset by a lower policy rate
- Implication: the central bank should accommodate financial shocks, to the extent these shocks cause a flight to safety and raise convenience yields. Maybe the Fed already does?
  - New term in Taylor rule vs. higher coefficient on output?


# Separability Matters

- $\frac{C_t^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \alpha \log Q_t \rightarrow$  Strong income effect
  - If consumption doubles, the marginal utility cost of buying a bond goes down, but the liquidity benefit the bond provides remains unchanged
  - Typical of how we model non-pecuniary liquidity demand (me too!)
- But this paper is specifically about the convenience yield – demand relationship
  - Worth showing robustness to alternative preference specifications
  - Same for the perfect deposit/bond substitutability (though qualitatively robustness is apparent)




# What the model may be missing

- Micro-foundation for the liquidity shocks
- Financial intermediaries (micro-foundations for  $\delta$ , supply of deposits)
- Risk premia
- Fiscal policy and supply of treasuries (particularly relevant going forward)
- Alternative model: Elenev, Landvoigt, Shultz, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2022) [ELVNS]







# ELVNS

- Ingredients
  - NK firms
  - Households holding equity, deposits, and LT Treasuries
  - Banks holding loans and ST Treasuries
  - Fiscal authority with counter-cyclical fiscal policy **until it's no longer sustainable** (endog. regime switch)
- Binscatter of inflation and convenience yield
  - Negative correlation at typical inflation levels
  - Positive correlation at high inflation
  - Driven by fiscal policy regimes



# Debt/GDP-Dependent Effects of a (Large) Negative Demand Shock and Policies

- Increase in the risk premia on future surpluses  $\rightarrow$  higher convenience yields
- At low Debt/GDP levels, causes
  - Large contraction
  - ZLB
  - Deflation
  - $\text{Corr}[\text{cy}, \text{inflation}] < 0$
- At high Debt/GDP levels, concerns about fiscal sustainability
  - Raise expected inflation, act as a negative supply shock (no ZLB)
  - $\text{Corr}[\text{cy}, \text{inflation}] > 0$



# Conclusion

- Interesting, important paper that sheds light on a relevant policy question!
- Simple, elegant model to highlight key channels that were operative in the last 100 years
- Summary of my comments
  - How much identification could we get without a full model?
  - How robust are the proposed channels to reduced-form assumptions and functional forms?
  - Even if a fiscal channel wasn't important in the past, it is likely to be in the future